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The Evolution of Russia’s IT Sector
This chapter describes the formation of the ICT field in post-Soviet 
Russia. The first section introduces the reader to the realities of a start-up 
Russian software firm and the role of personal networks in the company 
growth through a detailed description of the birth and development 
of Arcadia, one of the central software companies in St. Petersburg. 
The second section places this case in a larger historical context by 
depicting in a necessarily limited form the evolution of computing in 
the Soviet Union. The third section describes the role of information 
technology in the collapse of the Soviet Union, drawing on the work of 
Manuel Castells. The last section focuses on ICT in post-Soviet Russia 
by describing its role in the Russian national economy, the use of ICT 
by the Russians, the state’s supportive measures in the IT field, and the 
position of Russian IT in the global economy.
Arcadia: The birth of a St. Petersburg software company
Arcadia’s story is told here to illustrate the role of personal networks in 
the early phase of the emerging Russian software industry. The story 
relies on the account of Arcadia’s founder and CEO Arkady Khotin, and 
will be reproduced here on the basis of a series of meetings and e-mail 
exchanges between the author and Khotin, and the article by Cook 
(2009).1
Khotin was one of the thousands of Soviet engineers, computer scien-
tists, and mathematicians whom the collapse of both the economy and 
governmental support for scientific research forced to find new jobs. 
Many emigrated, but those who did not had to make a living at a time 
when the economy and society were floating from one crisis to another, 
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when the institutions of the market economy had not yet been created 
but the Soviet ones had started to fall apart.
Khotin’s recollections describe vividly the background of the first 
Russian IT entrepreneurs coming from the ranks of research institutes, 
the difficulties they faced in the early years of the formation of the 
software industry, and the central role of social relations in overcom-
ing these problems. The story will be presented in chronological order, 
depicting the most important steps taken and the resources accumu-
lated during Khotin’s professional career.
Potatoes and punchcards at a scientific research institute (1972–8)
After graduating from the Leningrad Institute of Aviation Engineering 
as a radio engineer, Khotin served two years in the Red Army base near 
Tallinn, the capital of Estonia. After serving in the army Khotin, now 
a reserve lieutenant, landed a job in 1972 as a hardware developer in a 
research institute, conducting studies in the field of hydrological tech-
nology in his native Leningrad. Khotin’s institute was secret, as were 
many Soviet research institutes – even the researchers in the different 
departments were not supposed to know what was being studied next 
door. As Khotin’s work was not in any way related to computers and his 
laboratory did not have one, he was introduced to the world of comput-
ing by a lucky coincidence. 
In the Soviet era, the employees of the institute were sent once a year 
to help nearby state farms to harvest potatoes. During these trips, which 
were called kartoshka (potato) by the staff, there was not much to do 
in the evenings but drink vodka and get to know the researchers from 
the other laboratories. Bumping into one of these acquaintances at the 
institute later on proved crucially important for Khotin’s future:
I ran into this guy in the corridor of our institute. He was carrying 
a huge pile of Hollerith cards [punch cards used for programming]. 
I did not know what they were because our laboratory did not have 
any computers and I jokingly swiped the whole pile to the floor. 
He got very angry and shouted that he’d been working on them for 
months and I had ruined everything. I apologized, helped him to 
pick the cards up and sat with him several evenings helping to re-
sort them. While doing this I grew interested in programming and 
computers. ‘What is this computer? What do you do with it?’
Khotin started to study programming voluntarily in evening courses. 
One of his young teachers – today a professor of computer science at a 
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prestigious St. Petersburg university – told the course participants that 
they needed to start learning programming or they would find them-
selves on the street in a few years’ time.
Computerizing Soviet factories at the state computing firm 
‘LSMNU’ (1979–89)
Khotin took this advice seriously and left the research institute in 1979 
for the state firm LSMNU,2 which specialized in the computerization 
of Soviet factories under the ministry of industrial instrumentation 
and engineering (Minpribor). The Ministry had given orders to allocate 
computers to individual factories, many of which did not understand or 
know how to operate them. It was Khotin and his work brigade who were 
responsible for helping the factories under the command of the ministry 
nation-wide to install copies of Western minicomputers. M40, which 
Khotin was installing and programming, had only one kilobyte of RAM 
(random access memory) and 16 kilobytes of ROM (read only memory).
Instead of waiting to be ordered to visit the clients, Khotin travelled 
to the Moscow factory producing M40s. He managed to get the names 
and phone numbers of the client factories where the computers were to 
be distributed. His initiative, which earlier could have been subject to 
disapproval as divergence from the behavior of an average Soviet engi-
neer, was backed up by the introduction of the khozraschet ideology in 
the Soviet Union, which emphasized independent economic account-
ing for the individual production units. 
According to khozraschet, each Soviet enterprise should make ends 
meet on its own, requiring initiative and sales and marketing skills 
that had not been top priorities for Soviet factory managers. With the 
allocation list of M40 minicomputers in hand, brigade leader Khotin – 
worried about the future of his job – started phoning factories, intro-
ducing himself, and offering help in M40 installations. This market-
ing campaign resulted in a long chain of work trips throughout the 
vast Soviet state. Khotin visited factories that produced anything from 
shoelaces to gunpowder and rockets, helping their staff unpack, install, 
connect, and program the new machines. However, with the years he 
grew tired of continuous traveling. Also, the state of affairs in the Soviet 
periphery differed drastically from the official rosy picture:
In the mid 1980s our brigade visited a factory in a Siberian town that 
was producing shells for Katyusha rockets. When we had finished 
our job in the evening and were about to return to the hotel, the fac-
tory engineer asked us to wait for a moment. He left the room and 
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returned after a while with a one meter long sharpened metal stick. 
He insisted on walking us to the hotel, protecting our safety with 
this metal stick.
For Khotin’s future career the time at LMNSU was important, not only 
in terms of gaining concrete though necessarily limited work experience 
but also in making new connections with the management of the Soviet 
factories. It was one of these managers who invited him to take a job 
as software director in a Russian–American joint venture in Leningrad 
in 1989, the next important step in Khotin’s path toward founding his 
own software company. 
Gaining contacts and competences in the Russian–American joint 
venture Dialogue (1989–92)
Dialogue was one of the very first Russian–American joint ventures – 
Russians supplying the programmers and Americans the funding – 
established in the Soviet Union. It had an office in both Moscow and 
Leningrad, and it worked as a Russian dealer for several Western IT 
companies, mostly selling computers and, among other things, conduct-
ing localization of MS Word and other Microsoft products.3 Khotin’s 
role in the Leningrad office was to develop software projects inside and 
outside Russia. Getting projects outside of Russia was hard, so he focused 
on getting factory computerization projects in the Leningrad area.
The job at Dialogue was an eye-opening experience, exposing Khotin 
to a world totally different from his experience in the Soviet economy. 
It allowed him to, among other things, travel to New York and Boston 
as early as 1990, when visiting abroad was still impossible for all but a 
few people in the Soviet Union. 
During his time with Dialogue, Khotin established a network of 
important connections, gained competences vital for conducting 
business, and got connected to the world outside the Soviet Union. 
The joint venture functioned as a nexus of contacts and a springboard 
for many future Russian businessmen such as Khotin’s boss, Vitaly 
Savelev, who is currently the CEO of the Russian airline company 
Aeroflot. Khotin, who himself was asked to join Dialogue by his former 
client at LMNSU, continued the chain by inviting another former 
client of LMNSU to join Dialogue and, years later, to join Khotin’s 
own software company.
The connections made during my years at Dialogue were very 
important and they still are. If you look at my LinkedIn network 
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[a business-oriented social network site], you will see that many peo-
ple in my network have had some relationship with this company.
Most importantly, Dialogue allowed Khotin to meet with and learn 
from many US businessmen. In the early 1990s there was a keen inter-
est in Russian transition, and Dialogue had several high-caliber visi-
tors. Among them was Bill Gates, with whom Khotin shook hands and 
talked during Gates’ Russian trip where he was spreading his vision of 
getting computers ‘on every desk’. Khotin learned both business skills 
and terms from these encounters and gained experience in speaking 
English. Every one of these encounters taught a former Soviet radio 
engineer something important, from the English language to Western 
business practices, and one of them also forced him to face an existen-
tial question: 
I met a 17-year-old American student whose father had sent him to 
Russia to gain experience. He asked me what I am going to do in five 
years. That was first time anyone had asked me such a question and 
the first time I had ever thought about it. The Party was supposed to 
take care of us, so there had been nothing to think about. I realized 
that I had been living like a vegetable!
When conducting computerization in a factory located in Vyborg, 
a small town near the Finnish border, Khotin actively used the program-
ming language Clipper, which was mainly used for database program-
ming. Having gained considerable expertise in this language and being 
surrounded by Americans ‘who believed that users had some rights’, 
he founded the first Russian Clipper users group, which was joined by 
some two hundred Russian IT specialists. Having close contacts with 
this professional community later encouraged him in his decision to 
establish his own business:
One of the most important factors behind my decision to leave 
Dialogue and start up my own business was the idea that there were 
two hundred developers whom I knew and with whom I could work 
on projects. If I had been a single guy with no support, I probably 
would not have dared to do it.
Among the important lessons Khotin learned at Dialogue was how to 
communicate abroad through computers. The company built one of 
the first Bulletin Board System nodes in Russia and joined FidoNet – a 
network connecting Russian and foreign personal computers through 
26 Networks in the Russian Market Economy
modem and phone line – in the early 1990s when the Internet was 
not yet available in Russia.4 The first connection between the Russian 
nodes of the network to the West was established through the personal 
computer of a Finnish user who every night received data in a trunk 
call from his Russian counterpart for whom it was possible to phone 
abroad for free. 
However, the commercial success of the joint venture did not come 
about as wished. The enthusiasm of the employees could not replace 
the lacking business skills and control of funds, only a part of which 
was used for business development. When Dialogue widened its sphere 
of activities and started trading ‘all kinds of goods’, Khotin began to 
look for other options, already having decided to start up his own 
company.
Founding and early years of the software company Arcadia 
(1992–present)
Khotin was invited to a teaching job at an educational institute in 
St. Petersburg in 1992, again by an acquaintance, also a former employee 
of Dialogue. The meager salary was compensated by the free use of a 
computer and free access to the Internet – both rare opportunities in 
the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. At Dialogue Khotin had already 
understood the importance of foreign contacts and learned to use the 
Internet, which knowledge he now put to use: 
At that time one of my friends gave me a small laptop computer. 
Consequently, in the daytime I was teaching, while in the evening 
I was using computers and Internet at my office and at night browsed 
BBS world from that tiny laptop with just small floppy instead of HD.
(Cook 2009: 4–5)
Though the idea of his own software company had emerged for the 
first time already during his second or third year at Dialogue, the final 
decision was made in March 1993 in Khotin’s kitchen, together with 
his wife, a professional programmer, and their daughter – all former 
graduates of the same technical university. The firm was named Arcadia, 
mimicking Khotin’s first name, ‘after 30 seconds of reflection’ and the 
accountant, a key person in a Russian firm, was recruited from among 
the former students who had gone through summer training by his wife 
at her office at the university. 
Khotin’s experiences of Western connections from the Dialogue years 
and the lack of demand for software development services in domestic 
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markets encouraged him to look for customers outside of Russia. He 
tried every possible channel to raise the interest of potential foreign 
clients through active e-mailing to various bulletin boards. Following 
up on an idea from a friend, he even sent an email in 1993 to the NBC 
nightly news, which was inviting viewers to send in e-mail messages 
from all over the world. This mail was read on air by the NBC news 
anchor, because it differed from the other 3000 messages sent in (Cook 
2009): 
Subject: From Russia with Love
Dear Americans,
My warmest seasons greetings from St. Petersburg Russia. Please keep 
up your great work in helping us to dig ourselves out from the deep 
hole that we got into about 70 years ago. I am sure it will be reward-
able for both nations!
Cheers, Arcady Khotin
In addition to e-mails, Khotin started writing articles in Boardwatch 
magazine, one issue of which was read by the Florida-based US citizen 
Philip Schwartz, who asked Khotin to transmit a message from Schwartz’ 
Russian friend to St. Petersburg. This contact started an intensive com-
munication between the two men, which continues until today, and 
provided Khotin with an important mentor who advised him how to 
conduct business:
It turned out that we were same age and had similar interests in 
many areas. Philip and I began a very heavy e-mail communication 
over a period of weeks and then months and now even years. I was 
asking him tons of questions about how to do business. We called 
that e-mail stream Schwartz University. This was possible for me to 
accomplish in part because of the time shift. I would take care of my 
daily affairs and then send him e-mail. He would be up and running 
in Florida by late afternoon my time and we would exchange three or 
five or even 10 e-mails in a 24-hours period. He was extremely help-
ful. He sent me the modem, then a laptop, and then invited me over. 
He gave me invaluable help in developing my early business.
(Cook 2009: 9)
Finally one of Khotin’s e-mails on a bulletin board was read by a US citi-
zen from Long Island, who became his first customer. This first contract 
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helped him to rent a two-room office on the outskirts of St. Petersburg, 
buy three computers, and hire three programmers from among his old 
contacts in the Russian Clipper user group. 
The first contract, which was based on the fact that a good program-
mer’s pay was at the time USD 150 a month in Russia, kept Khotin 
afloat but was not enough. Khotin continued his search for clients 
by following the Internet, reading articles in Computerworld or on BBS 
message boards and sending innumerable e-mails offering IT services. 
To overcome the trust gap, he volunteered to do some work for free, 
hoping that a happy customer would continue to work with him for 
pay. This was not, however, an easy effort, since he still lacked expertise 
in basic business practices such as how much to charge the customers, 
as the following recollection from 1994 shows:
I had no idea about how to speak at the terms of payment. I had 
no idea of the concept of things like retainers. My Soviet mentality 
did not allow me to ask. (…) when someone asked me how much 
I wanted to be paid for this activity, I had no idea how to arrive at an 
appropriate figure. I began to ask Philip for help and advice which he 
began to generously offer me. In trying to price a small project I had 
no idea how to say it would be about $500 or it would be in the lower 
hundreds of dollars. Philip had software development experience 
and he was very good in helping me formulate proper estimates.
(Cook 2009: 9)
In addition to the problems with foreign business practices and cus-
toms, the domestic ones proved to be even more difficult. Starting as 
an entrepreneur in Russia was not easy in the early 1990s, when many 
basics for the normal running of a company such as computers, print-
ing paper, or properly working phone lines were hard to get, unreliable, 
or expensive, regulations concerning business were constantly chang-
ing, and banks were unreliable and often bankrupting. 
The domestic markets were riddled with corruption and violence and 
the cat-and-mouse game with tax inspectors was one of the many prob-
lems which had to be solved with the help of trusted social ties:
[personal contacts were used] to find out how to write a report to tax 
inspection. This was very important because our state agencies did 
not know what we were doing, they did not understand it. (…) For us 
it was enough to send the software to the client through the Internet. 
But the tax inspector did not understand what the Internet was. They 
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suggested that we save the software on a diskette and send it by mail 
so that there would be a tangible product crossing the border. We 
started sending diskettes like fools but then someone realized that we 
could send state secrets on them – their contents should be checked 
at the corresponding state agency which could then authorize the 
sending. What idiotism! Well, we of course asked each other how you 
solve this problem, what do you write in the contract?
By 1996 Khotin had grown tired of flying three times a month to meet 
the US clients and started looking for customers closer to home. A natu-
ral choice was neighboring Finland, whose capital Helsinki was located 
only 300 kilometers west of St. Petersburg. Khotin decided to pay a visit 
to Finland in order to attend an IT seminar with his best programmer 
in 1996:
I had no money to pay for his seminar but I said look if I can make 
a presentation, will you let me in? He [the Finnish seminar organ-
izer] said sure. (…) We went to the seminar and spent six hours lis-
tening to presentations in the Finnish language and then we made 
our own presentation in English. People were complimentary and 
I thought ‘wow, we will get some projects’ but we returned back to St 
Petersburg and nothing happened. I definitely had raised some inter-
est but I had a zero marketing skills including a lack of understanding 
of how to follow-up. I even went without business cards. They said 
we will send you something but they did not even know my e-mail 
address. I was still a very inexperienced person.
(Cook 2009: 10)
Despite Khotin’s inexperience in selling services, this conference led 
later on to an important contract with the owners of the Finnish anti-
virus company Data Fellows (currently F-Secure) which remains his 
customer to this day. Observing and learning from the Finns doing 
business has been a practical business school whose example Khotin is 
still in the process of applying to his own firm. 
The fall of the Russian ruble in 1998 was a catastrophe for many 
Russians, but for Khotin and other software exporters whose custom-
ers paid in dollars, it meant a sudden and large rise in income. For the 
first time in his career, Khotin was able to hire staff – in addition to 
himself, an accountant, and a system administrator – whose hours were 
not directly billable from customers. The company joined the RUSSOFT 
association in 1999, and the 2000s have been marked by the growth of 
30 Networks in the Russian Market Economy
the company from the original four-man office to one of the major St. 
Petersburg software houses. Arcadia has, among other things, started 
its own recruiting agency, opened a Finnish office, and completed ISO 
certification. The growth also translates to the continuous need for 
keeping the hired programmers employed. Here, again, personal rela-
tions come in handy:
I am pulling all my strings. I have almost 600 connections on 
LinkedIn. To e-mail my contacts about the availability of these people 
I would search within LinkedIn for data security and throw in a few 
other appropriate terms to find a subset of my contacts in Scandinavia 
or in Russia to whom I would send e-mail. If the guys are in my net-
work, I can send e-mail directly to them. If they are in the network of 
an acquaintance and look especially good, I can ask the acquaintance 
to help out. I knock on the door and say ‘hey I have spare resources. 
Can you help me to find someone who can put them to work?’
(Cook 2009: 24)
In hindsight, all the phases in Khotin’s professional career now seem to 
have been in some way beneficial for his future entrepreneurship. Work 
at the research institute introduced him to computers and program-
ming, and the job at the state computing firm gave him practical expe-
rience in collaborating with enterprises. Particularly significant was the 
period at the joint venture Dialogue which connected him to the world 
outside the Soviet Union and taught him communication and linguistic 
and business skills. Most importantly during his time at Dialogue, he 
established a great number of both domestic and foreign contacts, such 
as the Russian Clipper user group and his US mentor Schwartz. 
In all, Khotin’s career testifies not only to his personal abilities but 
also to the power and reach of his personal network ties and the over-
lapping of the personal and professional spheres of life. Khotin was 
invited first to work at Dialogue by his former customer at the state 
computing firm and then to a teaching job by his former colleague 
at Dialogue. While at Dialogue, he himself recruited his former client 
from the state computing company to work with him, and founded a 
professional Clipper community, from which he later recruited his first 
programmers. Finally, the founders and key persons of Arcadia were 
selected in and through the trusted ties of family – a natural choice 
under the conditions in Russia in the early 1990s.
These ties and networks formed the social basis for Arcadia’s birth and 
growth. But the story of Arcadia also illustrates how, in addition to the 
social aspects, the emergence and success of a post-Soviet Russian firm 
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has to be placed and understood in historical perspective. This is what 
the next two sections try to do for the Russian IT sector.
Computing in the Soviet Union
The basis for Soviet computing and later post-Soviet Russian IT was 
already laid by the development of higher education and scientific 
research in imperial Russia. Though the turmoil of the 1910s and 1920s 
hampered progress, both mathematics and electronic engineering 
developed intensively in the 1920s and 1930s, stimulated by Lenin’s 
famous GOELRO program (Gosudarstvennaia komissiia po elektrifikatsii 
Rossii) for building a nation-wide electricity distribution network in 
the Soviet Union. The strong growth of power engineering had great 
impacts on the early period of Soviet computing, whereas later on the 
computing needs of the Soviet military sector came to be of primary 
importance (Fitzpatrick et al. 2006).
The construction of the first Soviet digital computer MESM (Malaia 
Elektronnaia Schetnaia Mashina, ‘small electronic calculation device’) 
during the years 1947–51 under the leadership of S. A. Lebedev, one of 
the founding fathers of Soviet computing, illustrates well the material, 
organizational, and ideological constraints under which the pioneers of 
Soviet computing operated.5 Researchers of the history of computing 
even claim that ‘no all-electronic computer was ever built under more 
difficult conditions’ (Goodman 2003: 21).
Crowe and Goodman (1994) offer a vivid account of the struggles of 
Lebedev, who was appointed the director of the Institute of Energy of 
the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences, located in a former monastery in a 
suburb of Kiev, in 1946.6 Lebedev had already started working on elec-
tronic triggers and arithmetical research related to computing systems 
in 1939, but the Second World War interrupted his work. The work by 
his institute was slowed down by the shortage of materials in the war-
torn country, as it was unable to deliver the needed quantity and quality 
of components. Lebedev also had to fight the administrative, ideologi-
cal, and science policy barriers, the protagonists of analog computing, 
and, in the 1950s, with a competing Soviet computer design project, 
‘Arrow’ (Strela).7 When building MESM, Lebedev had to convince the 
Soviet leadership and scientific community of the importance and 
future of digital computing, which at the time was evident in neither 
the Soviet Union nor the US.
Despite the obstacles, MESM solved its first simple problem on 
November 6, 1950, was exhibited to a commission of scholars from the 
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Ukrainian Academy of Sciences in January 1951, and was accepted into 
full operation in January 1952 (Crowe and Goodman 1994).
In the 1950s Lebedev moved to Moscow and continued his work, 
first with a new high-speed computer, BESM (Bystrodeistvuiushchaia 
Elektronnaia Schetnaia Mashina, ‘high-speed electronic calculating 
machine’), and then from 1954 onwards with M-20, a computer based 
on germanium diodes, which would replace the unreliable vacuum tubes 
of the earlier models.8 M-20 was completed in 1958, about the same time 
as a project named BESM-2, and its serial production started in Moscow 
in early 1959 (Crowe and Goodman 1994). The beginning of the produc-
tion of M-20 computers marked the starting point for the development 
of the Soviet computer industry, and stimulated the production of a 
series of M-20 compatible computers. In 1961 the M-20 computers’ users 
association, the first professional association of computer specialists in 
the Soviet Union, was established (Prokhorov 1999: 5–7).9 
During the Cold War, military reasoning gained a primary position in 
the development of Soviet computing. Military computing had special 
requirements for the components, which also had to be domestically 
produced. The beginning of commercial production of Soviet transistors 
in 1956–8 started the production of special computers adapted to mili-
tary purposes (Khetagurov 2001: 192). The large share of these special-
ized military computers was a particular feature of Soviet computing, 
and, according to Susiluoto (2006: 147–8), even the universal computers 
were mainly used for military purposes.
Three military programs (nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and anti-
missile defense) dominated not only post-war Soviet computing, but 
also Soviet science and technology more generally. Their importance is 
illustrated by a quote from the Soviet cosmonaut Grechko recalling his 
experiences of working in the mid 1950s at the Academy Computation 
Centre on the BESM:
Kurchatov’s people [nuclear weapons researchers] used it in the day-
time and during the night Korolev’s people [designers of ballistics 
missiles and spacecraft]. And for all the rest of Soviet science: maybe 
five minutes for the Institute of Theoretical Astronomy, maybe half 
an hour for the chemical industry.
(Harford 1997: note 54, 220, cited in Gerovitch 2001: 269)
The tremendous investment of resources in the military sector in the 
Soviet Union produced well-known achievements in the areas of space 
flight and military technology, among others, at the expense of the 
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consumption and daily life needs of the general population. According 
to Manuel Castells, between 1940 and 1960 Soviet mainframe comput-
ers were not very far behind the achievements of the West,10 but in 
1965 the country’s leadership decided to shift from developing its own 
production to imitating Western computer technology – in the late 
1960s and 1970s copying the architecture of the IBM 360 (Crowe and 
Goodman 1994: 11).11 As a result of this decision the USSR’s informa-
tion technology sector became dependent on copying chiefly American 
technology and began to lag more and more behind the development 
of the West. 
Castells’ assessment, based on his research both in Soviet and post-
Soviet Russia, is in line with that of the US experts from 1988 (Global 
Trends in Computer Technology, 1988). According to this report, in the 
late 1980s the Soviet Union was lagging years behind the West in most 
areas of computing, with possible exceptions in the theory of program-
ming languages and information retrieval systems.12 
Many of the reasons for the backwardness of the Soviet computing 
industry were the same as for that of the Soviet economy in general. 
Not only did the individual Soviet factories not necessarily know what 
to do with computers but they also had little incentive to be more effi-
cient than what was required to fulfill the plan. There was a shortage 
of high-quality components needed for reliable hardware production, 
service for hardware and software was poor or lacking, and the ideologi-
cal control of information did not fit the needs of the new economy, 
increasingly based on the processing of information (Global Trends in 
Computer Technology, 1988). 
The excessive demand and lack of competition allowed the produc-
tion units to continue their Soviet-era habits of production, and the 
complex and overlapping organization of the industry led to cata-
strophic shortages:
The production of floppy disks has been a disaster. Production was 
assigned to four different ministries with the brunt of the task fall-
ing on Minpribor. However, at the lower levels in Minpribor, there 
was a scramble to find productions space, and the full capacity of 
50 million diskettes per year will not be reached before 1989. (…) The 
end result is a great shortage of diskettes.
(Global Trends in Computer Technology, 1988: 159)
In addition to problems of organizing production, Soviet computing also 
had to balance between ideological and pragmatic aspects of the field, 
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which was to have lasting consequences for its development. According 
to Gerovitch (2001), computing scientists and professionals in the 
Soviet Union were torn by the contradictory requirements of emulating 
and surpassing American computing on the one hand and keeping at 
a distance from cybernetics, which was ideologically discredited in the 
Soviet Union as reactionary pseudo-science, on the other. This tension 
was solved through a discursive strategy of distancing computing from 
cybernetics. This had, however, long-term impacts on Soviet science by 
limiting computer uses to mathematical physics: 
Soviet specialists in ‘machine mathematics’ had to walk a fine line 
between two mortal dangers – falling behind the West in comput-
ing, and following Western trends too closely. To avoid unwanted 
associations with controversial American cybernetics, they chose to 
‘de-ideologize’ Soviet computing and place emphasis on the narrow 
technical functions of computing and information theory, ignoring 
any potential conceptual innovations. This strategy severely limited 
the field of prospective computer applications. The computer was 
legitimized in this Soviet context as a giant calculator; its capacities 
as a data processor for economic and sociological analysis, and as a 
tool for biological research, were downplayed, to avoid ideological 
complications.
(Gerovitch 2001: 279)
In order to meet the ideological requirements, the Russian translations 
of Western computer literature were furnished with introductions con-
demning the ideological errors of these publications and the most dubi-
ous parts were just left out. Domestic publication of computer-related 
works was prevented both by a fear of revealing state secrets as well as 
helping out rival Soviet computing programs. Only after Khrushchev’s 
rise to power was cybernetics rehabilitated and legitimized (Gerovitch 
2001: 270–5). 
As a combined result of the problems and weaknesses described above, 
the Soviet Union missed the explosive growth of personal computing 
taking place in the West during the 1980s. While in the US interactive 
and user-friendly personal computers were revolutionizing office work, 
home entertainment, and computer-mediated communication, this 
development was absent in the Soviet Union. According to the estimate 
of a firm negotiating an agreement to sell computers to the USSR, and 
the information published by the New York Times, the USSR had 50,000 
personal computers in 1988 – one for every 5600 people – while the US 
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had roughly 30 million PCs – one for every 8 people (Global Trends in 
Computer Technology, 1988).13 The assessment of the missed chances in 
the Soviet Union by US experts in 1988 is devastating: 
[T]he phenomenal growth of the PC in the United States depended 
on the characteristics and availability of the PC and its software, the 
demand environment, and marketing effectiveness. The PC offers 
such dramatic gains in simple areas such as maintaining a mailing 
list, generating form letters, doing word processing, and tracking 
budgets, to name but a few central applications, that it has become 
as indispensable to the office as the telephone and the copying 
machine. None of these conditions has been present in the Soviet 
Union. The Soviets have been unable to mass produce a reliable 
personal computer on the order of the IBM-PC, and support service 
is questionable at best. (…) The software distribution system is con-
voluted, and good software often never receives distribution because 
of the lack of copyright protection. Lower-level managers have far 
less autonomy, have not received any training in computing, and 
have little desire to start using computers. Generally speaking they 
are not in a data-rich environment where they could connect PCs 
to mainframes or networks. The individualistic and entrepreneurial 
strains are generally missing from the Soviet culture, and the absence 
of any home computers, for all practical purposes, has precluded the 
possibility of the emergence of the home computer phenomenon so 
familiar in the West.
(Global Trends in Computer Technology, 1988: 160)
In the spirit of perestroika, many problems of the computing industry 
could be discussed publicly, and attempts at reorganizing the field 
of the Soviet computing industry were made by creating two new 
organizations in 1986: the State Committee for Computing and 
Informatics was to coordinate and develop Soviet computing and 
promote the use of computers in the economy; and the Interbranch 
Scientific Technical Complex for Personal Computers was established 
to address the problem of continuity in the research and development 
cycle and the problem of ministerial departmentalism. Both institu-
tions had to struggle with the already existing Soviet organizations 
and their results were meager (Global Trends in Computer Technology, 
1988).
The collapse of the Soviet Union finally brought to end these 
and other experiments to revive the Soviet system from the inside. 
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According to Manuel Castells (2000), information technology played 
a notable role in this collapse, and this role will be the subject of the 
next section.
Information technology and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union
Castells bases his interpretation both on his own fieldwork in the Soviet 
Union during the years 1989–96 and on the studies conducted by his 
wife, Emma Kiselyova (Castells 2000: 5).14 After Castells and Kiselyova 
the development of post-Soviet Russia’s IT sector has, with a few rare 
exceptions, been studied chiefly by private companies and market 
research departments. Exceptions in the area of information technology 
are, for example, Castells 2000; Gaslikova and Gokhberg 2001; Averin 
and Dudarev 2003; Hawk and McHenry 2005; Lonkila 2006; Rantanen 
2001; and Susiluoto 2006.
In Castell’s interpretation a central reason for the Soviet Union’s 
bankruptcy was the inability of the Soviet economy, or, in Castell’s 
terminology, the centrally planned ‘industrial statism’, to mold itself to 
the demands of a new economy based on information processing.15 
Purely from the viewpoint of extensive economic growth, the growth 
of the Soviet Union’s economy after the Second World War was a suc-
cess story – although it was bought at the expense of human suffering 
and overuse of natural resources. According to Castells, for the greater 
part of its history the Soviet Union’s economic growth was in fact larger 
than in Western countries and the speed of the country’s industrializa-
tion is unequalled in world history. 
Comparative growth abated only in 1975 and came to a standstill in 
1980. Because of the absence of the price mechanism, the economy’s 
resources were not allocated efficiently, and Soviet citizens became 
accustomed to life in a shortage economy. Nor was the economy able 
to develop internationally competitive, non-military products: the role 
of the Soviet Union in the international market became the massive 
export of raw materials, especially oil and gas which, coming into the 
1980s, comprised 90 percent of the USSR’s exports to capitalist countries 
(Castells 2000: 10–24). 
Most catastrophic, however, was the drop-off in the speed of techno-
scientific development. The primary reason for this was the hegemony 
of the military-economic complex as well as an untenably large defense 
budget, which in the 1980s was about 15 percent of the gross national 
product – proportionally about twice as much as Reagan’s government 
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comparatively spent. The complex siphoned off both the best material 
and human resources from productive use, but it did not produce a 
spin-off effect on the side of the civil economy. The Soviet economy’s 
priorities were always the security needs of the Soviet state as defined 
by the military-economic complex, and the fundamental conservatism 
of the security ideology would not tolerate the risk-taking necessary for 
an innovation-based new economy.
In addition to the central role of the military-technological complex, 
another important reason for the failure of the Soviet economy was the 
lack of an innovation system. The rigid centrally managed planning 
system, international differentiation, and lack of competition did not 
compel innovation and risk-taking, but rather led to the organization of 
production in the accustomed way. The Soviet Union’s science academy 
was disconnected from the production plants, the research and develop-
ment of which were based on each ministry’s own research institutes. 
These in turn were not in contact with each other with the exception 
of an unsuccessful experiment in the Khrushchev era at the end of the 
1960s.
Finally, the information-technological revolution did not fit together 
with the Soviet system’s bureaucracy and ideological repression. Only a 
few Soviet scientists got to participate in international congresses, and 
the free circulation of information important for innovation was far 
from the Soviet system, where the use of typewriters and copy machines 
was tightly supervised. The new networked style of production could 
not be conciliated with the concentrated, hierarchical command 
economy (Castells 2000: 5–37).
If information technology had an impact on the demise of the Soviet 
Union, it also helped to save the fragile Russian democracy during the 
August putsch in 1991. Based on his interviews with key players, Rafael 
Rohozinski (1999: 1–2) describes in detail how the programmers of 
Relcom/Demos, one of Russia’s private Internet providers, were among 
the first to testify to the coup from their offices near the Kremlin, and 
started transmitting the information to network nodes across the Soviet 
Union:
Within hours, they had established a temporary network node at the 
White House and were e-mailing Yeltsin’s defiant declaration, reject-
ing the legitimacy of the coup committee to Russia’s regions and 
abroad (…) By evening, the Relcom network was acting as a major 
channel of information between Moscow and the regions, linking 
the multitude of major and minor actors opposed to the coup. (…) As 
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local and republican press organs increasingly drew upon Relcom for 
information about the unfolding drama in Moscow, the information 
vacuum, a key factor in the coup plotters’ game plan, was filled.
(Rohozinski 1999: 1–2)
The whole story of the collapse of the Soviet empire with its ensuing 
transformation of economic, political, and geographical orders in the 
1990s will not be reproduced here. Suffice it to say that the collapse 
of the economy destroyed the state budget which in its turn shattered 
the financial base of Russian scientific and research institutions. Some 
of them, however, managed to find a niche in the post-Soviet Russian 
ICT field, the description of which is the focus of the final section of 
this chapter. 
The ICT sector in the Post-Soviet Russian economy
The role of the ICT sector in Russia’s national economy
When assessing the role of the Russian ICT industry in the economy 
one has to bear in mind that it has, similar to other private enterprise in 
Russia, functioned for only under 20 years, and was born in the 1990s 
under particularly difficult conditions.16 The emergence of the Russian 
ICT field coincided with the global shift from mainframe to personal 
computing. This shift created a need for private companies provid-
ing system integration and software development services for the new 
platforms and contributed to the formation of the industry (Terekhov 
2003: 22). 
Despite the recent tendency of Russian software companies toward 
regionalization, the Russian ICT industry is geographically concen-
trated in relatively few centers, of which St. Petersburg, the location of 
our data collection, is the most important after Moscow. Though the 
St. Petersburg ICT market and companies are clearly smaller than in the 
capital, the city has been at the forefront of information technology, 
telecommunications and electronic engineering since imperial Russia 
through the Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia: Russia’s first phone 
line was erected between St. Petersburg and Gatchina in 1882 (Sokolov 
1992: 66) and Alexander Popov presented his radio receiver to the 
Russian Physical and Chemical Society in St. Petersburg in 1895.
In the Soviet Union, within the frame of the planned economy, 
a considerable amount of radio engineering, telecommunications, and 
electronics industry and research was located in northwestern Russia, 
and at the end of the 1980s more than 50 industrial enterprises and 
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scientific research organizations operated in Leningrad (Averin and 
Dudarev 2003: 37–8).
The St. Petersburg/Leningrad region also played an important role 
in the recovery of the post-Soviet Russian economy after the collapse 
of Soviet industrial enterprises and research organizations. Due to its 
geographical proximity to Western Europe, availability of educated 
workforce, and long traditions in the field, northwestern Russia was a 
central player in the development of the Russian IT industry and mobile 
telecommunications. The first cellphone call in post-Soviet Russia, 
for example, was made by the St. Petersburg mayor Anatoly Sobchak 
through the operator Delta Telecom in 1991, and the main optical fiber 
connecting the Russian Federation to Europe and the rest of the world 
goes through St. Petersburg and Finland. Several large international 
companies in the ICT related fields, such as HP, Siemens, LG, Microsoft, 
Google, Sun, and Intel, operate in the St. Petersburg area (Kärkkäinen 
2008: 70–81).
Today the Russian ICT industry is a small but rapidly developing 
sector of the economy, which until recently has stayed in the shadow 
of the energy sector. The ICT sector’s relatively small proportion of 
the economy (5 percent of the gross national product in 2005, accord-
ing to the minister of communications Leonid Reiman)17 has been 
compensated by its extremely rapid growth during the 2000s.18 One of 
the main engines of this growth – together with the general boost to 
the Russian economy fueled by rising oil prices – has been the develop-
ment of the telecommunications field, particularly cellphone use, in 
Russia.
In the 1990s cellphones were still out of reach of the general popu-
lation because of both the high prices of phones and the high tariffs, 
and they were chiefly considered symbols of the nouveaux riches and 
organized crime. After the economic crisis of 1998 and especially in the 
2000s, prices fell as competition was freed, cellphones lost their elite 
character, and their use exploded (Gladarev and Lonkila 2008). As a 
result, telecommunications accounted for 70 percent of the ICT sector 
in 2007 (see Table 3.1). 
Within the IT sector, the table shows how hardware’s proportion of 
the total IT markets diminished from 66 percent in 2003 to 56 percent 
in 2007, while during the same time the proportion of software devel-
opment grew from 13 percent to 18 percent, and that of services from 
21 percent to 26 percent. 
As the example of Ireland shows, software exports may function as an 
important source of foreign currency revenue in a national economy. 
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Though the value of Russian software exports has been modest, their 
proportion of the whole IT sector grew steadily during the first decade 
of the 2000s (see Table 3.2).
The clear majority of the Russian software export income in 2007 
came from software development services (58 percent), followed by 
sales of products and solutions (25 percent) and from international 
companies’ development centers in Russia (18 percent) (RUSSOFT 
Annual Survey, 2007: 12). The export of ready-made products was very 
concentrated: four companies accounted for over half of Russian soft-
ware exports including, in addition to ABBYY products, Kaspersky Lab 
(antivirus programs), CBOSS (billing systems) and Transas (navigation 
systems, vessel traffic management systems, marine and aviation simu-
lation systems) (RUSSOFT Annual Survey, 2008).
On average the Russian IT companies are small in comparison with 
international firms both in terms of sales and number of employees 
(see Table 3.3). Notable exceptions are such Moscow-based firms as 
Luxsoft, EPAM, and Exigen which employ 2000–5000 people each. The 
software companies based in St. Petersburg were clearly smaller than 
Table 3.1 The development of Russian ICT markets 2003–7, bn USD












Hardware  4.6  66  5.4  61  6.6  61  8.1  59  9.9  56
Software  0.9  13  1.1  12  1.5  14  2.2  16  3.1  18
Services  1.5  21  2.4  27  2.8  26  3.5  25  4.6  26
IT total  7.0 100  8.9 100 10.9 100 13.7 100 17.6 100
Telecommunications 12.9  18.8  23.3  31.7  40.5  
ICT total 19.9  27.7 34.2  45.4  58.1  
% telecomm of ICT  65  68  68  70  70
Source: Minkomsviaz’ (2009)
Table 3.2  Software exports’ proportion of the Russian IT sector 2003–7, bn 
USD
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Russian IT sector * 7.0 8.9 10.9 13.7 17.6
Software export ** 0.5 0.8 1.0 1.5 2.2
Software export % of IT sector 7.8 8.5 8.9 10.6 12.5
Sources:* Minkomsviaz’ (2009); ** RUSSOFT Annual survey, 2007
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their Moscow counterparts; none of them ranked among the 10 biggest 
Russian IT companies. The largest of the St. Petersburg companies 
employ only some hundred people and include companies such as 
Reksoft, DataArt, Digital Design, Arcadia, and Lanit-Tercom.19 Of the 
30 leading IT companies in northwestern Russia, the sales of the big-
gest one, BCC, amounted to 3,685,500 thousand roubles (roughly 142 
million USD) in 2006 and it employed 720 people (CNews Analytics 
2007).
These impressions of the comparatively small size of Russian IT com-
panies are supported by a 2008 survey directed at companies who were to 
some extent involved in exports of software products and services from 
Russia. Of the 96 companies who responded to the survey, 47 percent 
employed up to 30 people, 43 percent from 30 to 500, 5 percent from 
500 to 1000 and 5 percent more than 1000 people. In terms of turnover, 
43 percent of these firms had up to 0.5 million USD, 47 percent from 0.5 
to 10 million and only 10 percent over 10 million USD. 
ICT use in Russia
Though the figures on ICT use in Russia vary depending on the source 
and methodology, the general trend has been that of extremely quick 
growth. Chachin (2008), for example, estimates the growth rate of 
Internet users in 2006–7, based on the data from Russia’s ministry of 
communications, at 50 percent, the number of PCs at 36 percent, and 
number of households’ broadband access at more than 50 percent. 
Figure 3.1 shows the development in the use of Internet, personal 
computers, and mobile phones in Russia during the 2000s based on data 
from the Levada Center surveys.20
Despite the rapid growth, the general level of ICT use in Russia is still 
weak according to the international ‘network readiness index’. This 
index – which combines evaluation of the regulatory macroeconomic 
environment with the readiness and usage of ICT by individuals, busi-
ness, and government – positioned Russia in 2007–8 at 72, between 
Vietnam (73) and Kazakhstan (71). In the same list Denmark was 
Table 3.3 Median number of employees in the 100 biggest Russian IT 
companies 2003–7
Year 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Median no of employees 204 209 300 368 403
Source: CNews Analytics (2010)
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first, the US fourth, Finland sixth, and the UK twelfth (Dutta and Mia 
2009).
This impression is further reinforced by the results of the latest round 
of the European Social Survey offering comparative data on Internet use 
in Europe (Table 3.4).
The question was ‘how often do you use the Internet, the World Wide 
Web or e-mail – whether at home or at work – for your personal use?’
The table shows clearly that Internet use in Russia is lagging far 
behind the level of Western European countries. Internet use is also 
unequally divided in terms of geography, education, and income, and 
Table 3.4 The use of Internet in selected European countries in 2008, %
Germany Finland France UK Russia 
No access at home or work 22  12 22.5 21.1 62.4
Never use 8.8  13.7 10.6 7.5 7.6
Less than once a month 1.6  1.5 1.3 2.6 2.5
Once a month 1.1  1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3
Several times a month 6.1  2.6 2.4 4.2 3.1
Once a week 4.8  6 3.2 4.2 2.3
Several times a week 17.2  16.5 12.8 15.9 8
Every day 38.3  46.3 45.7 43.3 12.7
Total 100  100 100 100 100










2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Internet personal computer mobile phone
Figure 3.1 The use of Internet, personal computers and mobile phones in Russia, 
% of population
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Internet access is still hampered by the deficiencies of the old telecom-
munications infrastructure. 
Moreover, the Russian Internet is at least potentially subject to 
state control: while the original SORM legislation (Sistema Operativno-
Rozysknykh Meropriiatii, ‘System for Operational-Investigative Activities’) 
allowed officials to record all phone discussions, its updated version 
SORM-2 authorizes FSB to access all Internet Service Providers’ comput-
ers or other devices in order to monitor Internet traffic (cf. Alexander 
2004: 616). In practice the amount of Internet traffic limits the realiza-
tion of state control (see Alexander 2004 for a closer account of SORM 
and Russian Internet policy).21
State support for the Russian ICT industry
The state can have different kinds of roles in the development of ICT 
industry. At the center of Finland’s information society model, for 
example, has been a state-mediated relationship between the public and 
private sectors, in which the state has purposefully supported a politics 
of innovation both directly and through the universities and research 
institutes (Castells and Himanen 2001; see also Fligstein 2001).22
Throughout the 2000s Russia’s government as well has, at least in pub-
lic speeches, recognized the economic, strategic, and political aspects 
of the ICT sector, which has manifested in, for example, the Federal 
Program Electronic Russia covering the years 2002–10. The program 
was approved by the Russian government in 2002 with a total budget of 
2.6 billion USD. It aimed at increasing the effectiveness of government 
operation, developing the information transparency of the authori-
ties, improving industry legislation and stimulating higher ICT related 
education. The first results did not, however, meet expectations. The 
program budget was cut twice in 2003 and its actual outcomes remain 
unclear (Averin and Dudarev 2003: 109; Susiluoto 2006: 305–6).
During the 2000s there have been further state initiatives to boost 
non-energy-related areas of the Russian economy, such as the creation 
of ‘special economic zones’, ‘technology parks’, and venture investment 
funds and plans of reduced tax burdens on export-oriented Russian 
IT companies (Wilson 2007; Stewart 2008).23 Assessing these efforts, 
Gianella and Thompson (2007: 25–6) estimate, however, that without 
coordination between various state bodies, close monitoring of the 
budgetary funds, and evaluation of the effectiveness of the projects, 
there is a risk of duplication of effort, waste, and rent-seeking. 
This assessment is in line with the opinion of the authors of the 
Russian Software Developers Association’s report from 2008, based 
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on the annual survey of 96 Russian software-exporting companies. 
The general views of the companies on the business environment are 
devastating: a high number of companies gave ‘poor’ marks for most 
of the aspects inquired about, such as human resources availability and 
education system (52 percent), taxation system (45 percent), impact 
of bureaucratic and administrative barriers on business (63 percent), 
availability of up-to-date infrastructure (52 percent), financial support 
to start-ups (67 percent), and state support of international marketing 
activity (75 percent). These numbers clearly reveal the failure of the 
Russian state to markedly support working conditions for the software 
industry. Even in the cases where measures have been taken, as the 
examples of the e-Russia program and technology parks above show, 
they have failed to produce substantial results:
Still there is no significant progress in implementation of projects 
on technology parks construction specifically for IT companies 
(including software developers) with state financial support. Design 
and construction of technology parks in some cities is already in 
progress. But it goes slowly and the terms for property construction 
are constantly shifted. Besides, initiators of these projects have little 
understanding of the final results. There are reasons to assume that 
within the framework of technology parks ordinary business would 
be constructed (not only for IT companies).
(RUSSOFT Annual Survey, 2008: 22)
This is also the case with taxation, where the law on reduction of the 
Unified Social Tax for software exporters from 26 percent to 16 percent 
turned out to be inconsistent with Russian pension legislation. Neither 
has an amendment in the Russian Federation Tax Code exempt-
ing value-added tax on sales of licensed software worked in practice 
(RUSSOFT Annual Survey, 2008: 20).
The authors of the report estimated the situation of the creation 
of special economic zones, where residents and high-tech companies 
are granted special privileges, in somewhat brighter terms, but saw 
no significant progress in the development of ‘science cities’ in which 
research centers were supposed to receive additional funding from local 
and federal budgets (RUSSOFT Annual Survey, 2008: 22).
According to the survey, Russian ICT firms consider bureaucratic 
and administrative barriers to be one of the most important business 
problems. As noted, 63 percent of firms in the survey described the 
level of solving bureaucratic and administrative barriers as ‘poor’, and 
particularly the St. Petersburg-based firms were among those affected by 
The Evolution of Russia’s IT Sector 45
the Russian bureaucracy. One example, given by the survey authors, was 
the difficulty in recruiting foreigners: 
The existence of barriers for recruitment of foreign staff in Russian 
companies looks absolutely illogical. Sometimes the inviting Russian 
party has to spend up to six months to formalize all required docu-
ments to make it possible for such specialist to work for one year in 
Russia. Some companies are ready to attract experienced foreigner 
or former Russian citizens to use their expertise and knowledge to 
arrange sales of ready-made solutions and products on the world 
markets. But they do not dare to undertake these steps precisely due 
to complicated bureaucratic formalities.
(RUSSOFT Annual Survey, 2008: 21–2)
Though a third of the firms in the RUSSOFT 2008 survey did note an 
improvement in state support of IT in the last two years,24 the authors 
of the report consider this number to be based on hopes of the industry 
being finally taken seriously and supported by the state. According to 
the authors, however, no substantial results have been reached:
The situation was seriously aggravated by the fact that the new 
Government did not include a ministry responsible for information 
technologies. The former Ministry of Information Technologies, 
and Communications was transformed into the ministry of Mass 
Communications losing IT in its official name.
(RUSSOFT Annual Survey, 2008: 25)
In addition to the bleak estimates of the situation in 2008, most param-
eters of the business environment for software development companies 
had slightly worsened or remained the same in comparison with 2007 – 
with the lone exception of property rights. However, the report also 
concludes that the difficulties hit the medium-sized companies hardest 
whereas a group of large companies – also facing a lot of problems – had 
‘more opportunities to overcome them’, as the authors ambiguously 
remark (RUSSOFT Annual Survey, 2008).
To summarize, and in line with the crushing statement of President 
Medvedev cited in the introduction of this book, the available evidence 
suggests that the Russian state has so far failed to notably support the 
development of the IT field.
Russia’s position in the global ICT market
The Russian share in the global IT market is estimated at between 
1 percent and 3 percent (Russian ICT market overview, 2007). Russia does 
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not have significant, globally competitive hardware production nor – 
with some exceptions, such as the document conversion, data capture, 
and linguistic software produced by the company ABBYY – break-
through software applications competitive in the global mass market. 
Instead it is likely that many software products marketed as Western 
contain the work of Russian offshore programmers.
Michael A. Cusumano (2006) considers Russia’s position in the distri-
bution of labor in the global software industry in comparison with the 
situations of Europe, India, and Ireland:
Where does Russia fit into the global software business? Will compa-
nies there go the way of many other European firms and emphasize 
the science more than the business, and on expertly meeting the 
needs of local industry, but encounter limited success in global prod-
uct markets? Will Russia go the way of India and emphasize service 
companies that will do anything the client wants at highly com-
petitive prices but fail to build a products-based business? Will Russia 
become a lower-cost Ireland, with many small companies and lots of 
technical expertise, but too much emphasis on leisurely lifestyles and 
independence from venture capital and the stock markets?
(Cusumano 2006: 33)
He concludes that Russia’s competitive advantage lies in the ability to 
perform very sophisticated technical work at relatively low cost. 
In line with Cusumano’s conclusion, the high quality of Russian infor-
mation technology professionals’ mathematical competence is com-
monly recognized. One indication of this competence is the position of 
Russian students in the International Collegiate Programming Contest. 
The contest was won in 2009, 2008, and 2004 by the St. Petersburg State 
University of Information Technology, Mechanics and Optics, in 2006 
by Saratov State University, and in 2001 and 2000 by St. Petersburg State 
University, with other Russian universities commonly occupying other 
top positions in the contest.25 Considering the results of the contest, it 
is evident that top-level programmers are trained in Russia in Saratov, 
Perm, Izhevsk, Stavropol, Yekaterinburg, Novosibirsk, Ufa, Barnaul, Orel 
and Petrozavodsk, and about ten other Russian cities as well as Moscow 
and St. Petersburg (RUSSOFT Annual Survey, 2008: 33–4). 
The competitive advantage created by a high quality workforce 
is reduced by deficiencies in the project management and English 
language skills of university graduates. On the macro level the obsta-
cles to the development of Russia’s ICT sector are, among others, the 
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prevalence of pirating,26 poor infrastructure, underdeveloped legisla-
tion, the corruption of the public sector, and the bad image of the 
Russian state abroad along with its intrusion into the economy.27 
Moreover, the quick growth of the ICT sector, the concentration 
of activity in a few centers, particularly Moscow, St. Petersburg, and 
Novosibirsk, and the arrival and establishment of foreign companies 
(such as Sun, Microsoft, Alcatel, Motorola, Intel, and HP) in Russia have 
led to intensifying competition for skilled programmers. The rapid 
growth of demand together with a limited supply pool has led to a 
quick rise in salary levels in the early 2000s.28 Competition for compe-
tent workers also forces employers to organize their business activities 
better. For example, in order to get a bank loan, an employee needs a 
steady job and an officially paid ‘white’ salary. In addition to the salary, 
workers have begun to value social security and health care benefits 
paid by their employers.
The rise in wages has led to a reduction in the relative cost advantage 
of offshore programming done in Russia. This has forced companies, 
especially those concentrating on cheap outsourcing of programming, 
to develop new business models, such as orientation to the domestic 
market, establishment of branches outside of the Russian metropolises 
in places with cheaper labor (other Russian cities and former USSR coun-
tries, but also in Scandinavia and Western Europe), attempts to develop 
their own products and applications, and attempts to reach closer part-
nerships with customer companies. However, closer cooperation with 
customers also demands substantial domain knowledge from different 
fields. The ability of Russian offshore firms to acquire such knowledge 
and integrate themselves deeper into the business processes of the end 
customers may turn out to be decisive for the industry’s future. 
In all, the Russian ICT industry is, despite its small size, a strong and 
fast-growing field of the economy, with the telecommunications sector 
having a leading role. In terms of human resources, it also seems to 
have the potential to capitalize on Russian scientific and mathematical 
competences for the uses of economic diversification. But as the short 
review of the history of the field showed, the roots of the industry in 
many ways date back to the Soviet era. This rooting has commonly been 
referred to as the Soviet legacy or heritage. The next chapter turns to 
the analysis of the nature of this legacy, drawing both on the existing 
research and our own empirical data.
